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NOTES AND COMMENT
COMPETITION AS A TEST OF TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF PROTECTION OF
TRADEMARKS AND TRADENAMES
From early times the law has recognized the liability of one who
fraudulently markets his goods or services as those of another by
imitating the latter's trademark or tradename or trade symbols, or
who, to use the commonly expressed term, "passed off" his goods
as those of another.' As emphasized by the American Law Institute
in the Restatement of Torts "historically, the term 'passing off' des-
ignates only the case in which one of two rivals diverts the other's
custom to himself by fraudulently misrepresenting that the goods
which he is selling are the goods of the other." 2 The question to be
considered in this article is whether liability attaches in those cases
where the litigants are not trade rivals and not in actual competition 3
and there is no diversion of trade from the complaining party to the
alleged infringer.4
This problem may arise in two situations: (1) where the goods,
services or businesses of the litigants are different and not in com-
petition, and (2) where the alleged infringer operates in a territory
different from that in which the complaining party operates. This
note will concern itself only with the second situation although both
situations raise the same fundamental problem and some of the ques-
tions considered are common to both situations.
The expression, sometimes met with, that a trademark right is
' See 26 R. C. L. 875, Trademarks, Tradenames, and Unfair Competi-
tion, § 53.
2 RESTATEMSENT, ToRTs Vol. III, Introductory Note to Ch. 35, p. 541
(1938). See H. Milgrim & Bros. v. Schlesinger, 168 Ore. 476, 123 P. (2d)
196 (1942), where the pertinent passage of the Restatement is quoted with
approval; Time v. Viobin Corporation, 128 F. (2d) 860 (C. C. A. 7th 1942).
3 Actual or direct competition, as the term is used in this article, exists
where the litigants solicit the same trade from the same customers in the same
territory at the same time. See National Picture Theatres v. Foundation Film
Corp., 266 Fed. 208 (C. C. A. 2d 1920); Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lor-
illard Co., 7 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 3d 1925). Actual or direct competition
in that sense does not exist where the litigants although operating in the same
geographical area, do not offer the same kind of goods or services or do not
solicit trade from the same kind of customers or where the litigants although
engaged in like lines of business, do not operate in the same geographical area.
4 In the leading case of Yale Electric Corporation v. Robertson, 26 F.
(2d) 972, 973 (C. C. A. 2d 1928), the problem has been stated by L. Hand,
Circuit Judge, as follows: "The law of unfair trade comes down very nearly
to this-as judges have repeated again and again-that one merchant shall
not divert customers from another by representing what he sells as emanat-
ing from the second. This has been, and perhaps even more now is, the whole
Law and the Prophets on the subject, though it assumes many guises. There-
fore it was at first a debatable point whether a merchant's good will. indi-
cated by his mark, could extend beyond such goods as he sold. How could
he lose bargains which he had no means to fill? What harm did it do a
chewing gum maker to have an ironmonger use his trademark? The law
often ignores the nicer sensibilities."
1947 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
not limited in its enjoyment by territorial bounds, is certainly, if
literally taken, not a correct statement of the law. However, in view
of the development of the law in recent years, it can no longer be
said that the above expression is, as frequently stated in the cases,5
true only in the sense that wherever the trade goes attended by the
use of the mark, the right of the trader to be protected against the
sale by others of their goods in the place of his goods will be sustained.
There is one principle upon which courts seem to agree: The
mere fact that one has first appropriated or used a trademark or
tradename in a limited territory does not, by itself, operate to give
the first user the exclusive right to use the mark or name every-
where, and it is certainly correct to say that "the mere use" of a
tradename which one person has found highly successful in bringing
his goods to the favorable attention of the public in one business
territory, by another person in another business territory, does not
of itself constitute an actionable wrong. 6
However, the courts are in disagreement with respect to the
question what additional factors, apart from prior appropriation, de-
termine the territorial scope of the first user's rights.
Some authorities, particularly earlier ones, require actual com-
petition in the sense that the territorial scope of the first user's rights
is determined exclusively by the extension of his actual trade or
business, that is, by the extension of his commercial transactions.
But law is not static; it is an ever developing science and today in
most of the recent decisions in our federal and our state courts, in
actions based upon unfair trade practices, actual competition between
the litigants has not been held to be an indispensable prerequisite to
injunctive relief.7
Rule Requiring Actual Competition
There is a substantial body of authority which supports the rule
that the first user of a trademark, or a tradename, which has ac-
quired a secondary meaning, can obtain relief in an action for in-
fringement of his mark or name or for unfair competition only upon
a showing of actual competition with the alleged infringer by way
5 Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 60 L. ed. 713 (1916);
United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90, 63 L. ed. 141 (1918); Gen-
eral Baking Co. v. Goldblatt Bros., 90 F. (2d) 241 (C. C. A. 7th 1937), cert.
denied, 302 U. S. 732, 82 L. ed. 566 (1937); Bisceglia Bros. Corporation v.
Fruit Industries, 20 F. Supp. 564 (E. D. Pa. 1937), aff'd, 101 F. (2d) 752
(C. C. A. 3d 1939).
8 The Tent v. Burnham, 269 Mass. 211, 168 N. E. 735 (1929); Loew's
Boston Theatres Co. v. Lowe, 248 Mass. 456, 143 N. E. 496 (1924) ; Kaufman
v. Kaufman, 223 Mass. 104, 111 N. E. 691 (1916).
7 See Note, 148 A. L. R. 22 (1944), and collected authorities; 52 AM.
JuR., Trade Marks, Trade Names, etc., §§93 and 109; RESTATEmENT, TORTS
Vol. III, Introductory Note to Ch. 35, pp. 537, 540 (1938).
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of actual commercial transactions in the market with respect to which
protection is sought, and this rule has been applied a fortiori where
the alleged acts of infringement were committed in another country
than that in which the senior user had established his trade.8  In
keeping with this, it has been frequently stated that there cannot be
unfair competition unless there be in fact competition; 9 that gen-
erically, the term "unfair competition" presupposes a real competi-
tion, present or prospective, of some kind; and that to invoke the aid
of a court of equity the plaintiff must show that there is competitionY°
The dogmatic basis of the rule is the view that not only an
award of money damages at law but also injunctive relief in equity
is dependent upon the plaintiff's showing an injury which will result
in or threatens actual and substantial damages," such damages, as a
general proposition, meaning money damages or a financial, pecu-
niary, monetary loss.12 Where a defendant, although concededly
"palming off" his goods or services as those of the plaintiff, is not
in actual competition with the plaintiff, there is no diversion of trade
from the plaintiff to the defendant, and without such a diversion of
trade it seemed inconceivable to the courts that the plaintiff might
s Gauvin v. Smith, 26 F. Supp. 194 (D. Conn. 1939) (where it was held
that use of a trademark in Canada does not preempt use by another of the
same mark or name in the United States).
9 United States-Carroll v. Duluth Superior Milling Co., 232 Fed. 675,(C. C. A. 8th 1916); New Discoveries v. Wisconsin Alumni R. Foundation,
13 F. Supp. 596 (W. D. Wis. 1936);
California-Yellow Cab Co. v. Sachs, 191 Cal. 238, 216 Pac. 33 (1923);
Illinois-Ambassador Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Sherman Co., 226 Ill. App.
247 (1922) ;
Iowa-Sartor v. Schaden, 125 Iowa 696, 101 N. W. 511 (1904);
Massachusetts-Kaufman v. Kaufman, 223 Mass. 104, 111 N. E. 691(1916); Hub Dress Mfg. Co. v. Rottenberg, 237 Mass. 281, 129 N. E. 442(1921) ; Loew's Boston Theatres Co. v. Lowe, 248 Mass. 456, 143 N. E. 496
(1924); Women's Mut. Ben. Soc. v. Catholic Soc., 304 Mass. 349, 23 N. E.(2d) 886 (1939) (involving protection of the plaintiff's corporate name) ;
Michigan-Good Housekeeping Shop v. Smitter, 254 Mich. 592, 236 N. W.
872 (1931) ;
Nebraska-Riggs Optical Co. v. Riggs, 132 Neb. 26, 270 N. W. 667 (1937);
New Jersey-National Grocery Co. v. National Stores Corp., 95 N. J.
Eq. 588, 123 At. 740 (1924); Baltimore v. Clark, 131 N. J. Eq. 290. 25 A.(2d) 30 (1942);
New York-Astor v. West Eighty-Second St. Realty Co., 167 App. Div.
273, 152 N. Y. Supp. 631 (1st Dep't 1915) (where the court said that "without
competition there can be no unfair competition, and hence no invasion of any
equitable right") ;
Washington--Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Manheim, 59 Wash. 428, 110 Pac.
23 (1910).
10 Simplex Automobile Co. v. Kahnweiler. 162 App. Div. 480, 147 N. Y.
Supp. 617 (1st Dep't 1914).
I See 28 Am. Ju. 220, Injunctions, § 28.
12Astor v. West Eighty-Second St. Realty Co., 16 App. Div. 273, 152
N. Y. Supp. 631 (1st Dep't 1915) ; in general, see 15 Am. JUR. 387, Damages,
§ 2.
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suffer a financial loss of a kind which justified either money damages
or injunctive relief. Under this view diversion of trade is the ex-
clusive test of an action of unfair competition,' 3 and injury to the
complainant's reputation and good will is not a sufficient basis for
relief.
The rule that actual competition is an indispensable prerequisite
to relief in an action for infringement of a trademark or tradename
or for unfair competition has been applied to the situation where the
parties, although dealing in the same or very closely related goods or
services, solicit trade in different quarters or from different classes,
and'are, for this reason, not in direct competition with each other,' 4
as where one of the parties is a wholesaler and the other a retailer; 15
or where the defendants do not manufacture and sell the goods in
question to the trade, but merely certain parts thereof to one cus-
tomer, as in Canister v. Owens-Illinois Glass,16 where relief was de-
nied because the basis of the complaint of unfair competition was that
containers which were sold to the trade were manufactured in a
certain distinct way resembling the plaintiff's products, but the de-
fendants were not competitors of the plaintiff, since they did not
manufacture and sell containers to the trade, but merely manufac-
tured and sold to one customer; or where one of the parties was the
manufacturer and the other the operator of taxicabs.17
Consistent with the dogmatic basis of the above rule, though
inconsistent with the requirements of justice, relief has been denied
13Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510
(C. C. A. 7th 1912); Simplex Automobile Co. v. Kahnweiler, 162 App. Div.
480, 147 N. Y. Supp. 617 (1st Dep't 1914). Thus in a suit to restrain the
defendant, who held himself out to the public as an expert diamond appraiser,
from appraising diamonds sold by the plaintiffs at prices greatly below the
actual cost and market value of these diamonds the complaint contained no
allegations that the litigants were competitors, but disclosed that they were
not, and there was no contention that the defendant by his conduct was seeking
to entice away the plaintiffs' customers so that they would purchase goods
from him, it was held in Esskay Art Galleries v. Gibbs, 205 Ark. 1157, 172
S. W. (2d) 924 (1943), that the complaint wholly failed to state a case of
unfair competition.
14See Apollo Bros. v. Perkins, 207 Fed. 530 (C. C. A. 3d 1913), where
although both litigants were engaged in the business of selling cigarettes, the
appellate court agreed with the trial court that the evidence did not support
the charge of unfair competition because "The tvo brands of cigarettes are
not offered to the same market, and do not compete in fact."
'Is Regent Shoe Mfg. Co. v- Haaker, 75 Neb. 426, 106 N. W. 595 (1906);
cf. Nolan Bros. Shoe Co. v. Nolan, 131 Cal. 271, 63 Pac. 480 (1900); Ross
v. Neuville, 34 F. Supp. 466 (E. D. N. Y. 1940) (where the fact that plaintiff
was engaged in the wholesale business, and defendant in the retail business,
of selling ladies' hosiery seems to be one of the factors which induced the
court to deny a motion for a preliminary injunction).
16 95 F. (2d) 303 (C. C. A. 3d 1938).
17 Yellow Cab Co. v. Sachs, 191 Cal. 238, 216 Pac. 33 (1923). For a case
reaching the opposite result under substantially the same facts, see Checker
Cab Corp. v. Sweeney, 119 Misc. 780, 197 N. Y. Supp. 284 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
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even though at the time of the appropriation the junior user had
knowledge of the complaining party's trademark or tradename or even
though the infringer's intention to "palm off" his goods as those of
the complaining party and to take advantage of the latter's reputation
and to deceive the public was manifest.18
Rule Not Requiring Competition (Modern Rule)
Under some of the earlier 19 and most of the recent cases actual
competition is no longer the essential test nor an indispensable pre-
requisite of injunctive relief in an action for infringement of a trade-
mark or tradename or for unfair competition.20  There has been an
increasing tendency on the part of the courts to mould, and even to
expand, the legal remedy in this field to conform to ethical business,
and the emphasis is no longer on competition, 21 but rather on the
injury suffered by the complaining party and the public from the
confusion resulting from the infringer's acts. 22  It has been empha-
sized also that the doctrine of unfair competition is nothing but a
convenient name for the doctrine that no one should be allowed to
sell his goods as those of another, and while the doctrine is usually
invoked when there is actual market competition between the liti-
gants, there is no fetish in the word "competition" and the invocation
of equity rests more vitally upon the unfairness. 23
This view is applicable in the situation where there is no actual
competition in the territory in dispute and rests upon a recognition
that the owner of a trademark or tradename has a legally protected
Is Clark v. Freeman, 11 Beav. 112, 50 Eng. Rep. 759 (1848); Borthwick
v. Evening Post, 37 Ch. D. 449 (1888).
19 See Carroll v. Ertheiler, 1 Fed. 688 (E. D. Pa. 1880); The Collins Co.
v. Oliver Ames & Sons Corporation, 20 Blatchf. 542, 18 Fed. 561 (S. D. N. Y.
1883); Kingsley v. Jacoby, 28 Abb. N. C. 451, 20 N. Y. Supp. 46 (Sup. Ct.
1892); Wamsutta v. Allen, 12 Phila. Leg. Int. 535 (Pa. 1878); Collins Co.
v. Reeves, 28 L. J. Ch. 56 (1858).
2OKotabs v. Kotex Co., 50 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 2d 1931); Wood v.
Peffer, 55 Cal. App. 116, 130 P. (2d) 220 (1942); Lady Esther v. Lady
Esther Corset Shoppe, 317 Ill. App. 451, 46 N. E. (2d) 165 (1943) ; Churchill
Downs Distilling Co. v. Churchill Downs, 262 Ky. 567, 90 S. W. (2d) 1041
(1936); Armour & Co. v. Armour Shipping Corporation, 175 Misc. 695, 25
N. Y. S. (2d) 47 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (holding that absence of direct evidence
of competition was immaterial).
21 Stork Restaurant v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90 (E. D. Pa. 1941); Lincoln
Motor Co. v. Lincoln Automobile Co., 44 F. (2d) 813 (D. C. 1930); Phila-
delphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N. Y. Supp. 176(Sup. Ct. 1937).
22 Stork Restaurant v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90 (E. D. Pa. 1941).
23 The statement given above in the text was made by Judge Denison in
Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 6th 1924). Judge
Denison's statement has been quoted in numerous cases, the latest case being
51 West Fifty-First Corporation v. Roland 139 N. J. Eq. 156, 50 A. (2d)
369 (Ch. 1946).
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interest in its good will, that is, the favorable consideration shown by
the purchasing public to goods known to emanate from a particular
source,24 and that the right of the owner of good will to be protected
is not limited to the prevention of actual market competition.25 Thus
the fact that the defendant does not and probably will not deprive
the plaintiff of trade is no longer a valid defense.
26
There are various theories upon which, despite the lack of ac-
tual competition and diversion of trade, injunctive relief may be
granted; such as the theory that the injury to be prevented is that
to the complaining party's reputation and good will, or to his right
to expand his trade. But whatever may be the interest of the com-
plaining party sought to be protected in cases of this kind, it has
been held to be far less weighty than his interest in protecting his
actual sales, 27 and it should be emphasized that each case presents
a unique problem which must be answered by weighing the con-
flicting interests against each other.
28
Theories of Relief
Where the goods, services, or businesses of the litigants are not
in actual competition, a junior appropriator of a trademark or trade-
name or trade symbols ordinarily 29 is not actually diverting custom
and trade from the complaining party. Consequently, it has been
recognized that in this situation diversion of trade and the resulting
direct loss of sales 3 0 or actual monetary loss I" cannot be the basis
24 White Tower System v. White Castle System, etc., 90 F. (2d) 67(C. C. A. 6th 1937).
25 S. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 116 F. (2d) 427 (C. C. A. 2d 1940);
Bamberger Broadcasting Service v. Orloff, 44 F. Supp. 904 (S. D. N. Y.
1942).
26 Stork Restaurant v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90 (E. D. Pa. 1941).
27 S. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 116 F. (2d) 427 (C. C. A. 2d 1940);
Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132 F. (2d) 822 (C. C. A. 2d
1943) ; Durable Toy and Novelty Corporation v. J. Chein & Co., 133 F. (2d)
853 (C. C. A. 2d 1943).
28 Emerson Electric Mfg. Co. v. Emerson Radio & P. Corp., 105 F. (2d)
908 C. C. A. 2d 1939); Durable Toy & Novelty Corporation v. J. Chein &
Co., 133 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 2d 1943).29 In Wolff, Non-Competing Goods in Trademark Law, 37 COL. L. Rav.
582, 590 (1937), it has been pointed out that the defendant's goods, though not
the same as those of the plaintiff, may be in competition with plaintiff's in
the sense that the consumer's need for the plaintiff's article could be met by
his purchase of defendant's, as in regard to baking soda and baking powder
(Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 Fed. 35 (C. C. A. 8th
1910); Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 Fed. 276 (D. Ind. 1900)).30 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Radio Stores, 20 F. Supp.
703 (E. D. Pa. 1937); Vickers, Inc. v. Fallon, 48 F. Supp. 221 (E. D. Mich.
1943).
31Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N. Y.
Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Rainbow Shops v. Rainbow Specialty Shops, 176
[ VOL. 21
NOTES AND COMMENT
of relief. However, the courts have also recognized that diversion
of trade and the attendant direct loss of sales is not the only injury
which may result, but that other injuries may follow, such as an in-
jury to the complaining party's reputation and good will, the fore-
stalling of the normal potential expansion of his business, or the
"whittling away" or "dilution" of his trademark or tradename or
symbols. Unjust enrichment has also been considered as a basis
of relief.
Another theory of relief finds the complaining party's injury in
the fact that by the acts of the junior appropriator there has been
created a false impression of a trade connection between the parties,
possibly subjecting the first appropriator to liability or to embarrass-
ment of litigation.3 2
While all the theories above mentioned presuppose that the ulti-
mate wrong is the confusion of source or origin of goods or ser-
vices, there is one theory under which the "whittling away" or
"dilution" of the selling appeal of a trademark or tradename is re-
garded as the essence of the wrong, and under which consequently,
at least theoretically, relief may be available, even though there is
no confusion, and no likelihood of confusion, as to source on the part
of the customers.83
A. Reputation and Good Will: Where the goods, services, or
businesses of the litigants are not in actual competition, the right to
injunctive relief has frequently been rested upon the necessity of
preventing injury to the complaining party's reputation and good
will.3 4 This injury has been said to result from the infringer's rep-
resentation to the public that the complaining party produces a prod-
uct which the latter does not in fact produce, and over which it has
no control. As stated by Circuit Judge Learned Hand, a merchant's
"mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which
bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he
borrows the owner's reputation, whose quality no longer lies within
his own control." 3 5 An unwarranted financial reliability may be
Misc. 339, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 390 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Grand Trunk R. Co. v.
James, [1916] 10 Alberta L. R. 109, 29 D. L. R. 352.32 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Radio Stores, 20 F. Supp.
703 (E. D. Pa. 1937); Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163
Misc. 52, 296 N. Y. Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Walter v. Ashton, [1902]
2 Ch. 282; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. James, [1916] 10 Alberta L. R. 109, 29
D. L. R. 352.
33T. A. Vulcan v. Meyers, 139 N. Y. 364, 34 N. E. 904 (1893); N. Y.
World's Fair 1939, Inc. v. World's Fair News, Inc., 256 App. Div. 373,
10 N. Y. S. (2d) 56 (1st Dep't 1939); COLLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS (1945), Ch. 20, § 80.6, pp. 1124-27.
34 Rector v. Rector's Tavern, 163 Misc. 213, 299 N. Y. Supp. 26 (Sup.
Ct. 1937) ; Bamberger Broadcasting Service v. Orloff, 44 F. Supp. 904 (S. D.
N. Y. 1942) ; Lady Esther v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, 317 Ill. App. 451,
46 N. E. (2d) 165 (1943).5Yale Electric Corporation v. Robertson, 26 F. (2d) 972, 974 (C. C. A.
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credited to the infringer by third persons, and if such belief is un-
founded, the complaining party's reputation 36 or credit and financial
standing 3 7 may suffer. Injury, that is, a general loss of sales as dis-
tinguished from a direct loss on account of diversion of trade is evi-
dent where the defendant is competing with the complaining party's
customers rather than with the plaintiff, as where the plaintiff is
engaged in the business of selling materials for roofs to contractors
and the plaintiff's trademark is used as a tradename and part of its
corporate name by a defendant engaged in the roofing business,38 or
where the plaintiff is a wholesaler and the defendant is a retailer,3 9
the essence of the injury being that the plaintiff's customers are mis-
led to believe that the plaintiff has commenced competing with them.
Injury is evident also where the plaintiff's reputation has been,
or is likely to be, tarnished by the use of his trademark or tradename
in connection with an inferior product; 40 but the existence of an in-
jury has also been recognized even though the infringer's goods or
services are not such as would tarnish the complaining party's repu-
tation.41 Consequently, the fact that the complaining party's goods
are of a quality inferior to those manufactured by the infringer has
been held immaterial.42 To use Circuit Judge Learned Hand's
classic words, "a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor
and creator, and another can use it only as a mask," 43 and the com-
plaining party ". .. need not permit another to attach to its good
will, the consequences of trade methods not its own," 44 and need
not expose his good name to the hazards of another's conduct,45 it
2d 1928), quoted in Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc.
52, 296 N. Y. Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1937).86 Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 3d 1925).
37 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Radio Stores, 20 F. Supp.
703 (E. D. Pa. 1937); Rector v. Rector's Tavern, 163 Misc. 213, 299 N. Y.
Supp. 26 (Sup. Ct. 1937).38American Insulation Co. v. Eternit Roofing Corp., 14 F. (2d) 235
(E. D. N. Y. 1926).
3 British-American T. Co. v. British-American C. S. Co., 211 Fed. 933
(C. C. A. 2d 1914); Coca-Cola Co. v. Brown & Allen, 274 Fed. 481 (N. D.
Ga. 1921).
4 Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. Stevens, 15 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 5th
1926); Vickers, Inc. v. Fallon, 48 F. Supp. 221 (E. D. Mich. 1943); Phila-
delphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N. Y. Supp. 176
(Sup. Ct. 1937).41 Western Auto Supply Co. v. Knox, 93 F. (2d) 850 (C. C. A. 10th 1937);
Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Cafe, 159 Misc. 551, 288 N. Y.
Supp. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1936); H. Milgrim & Bros. v. Schlesinger, 168 Ore. 476,
123 P. (2d) 196 (1942).
42 Yale Electric Corporation v. Robertson, 26 F. (2d) 972 (C. C. A. 2d
1928).
43 Id. at 974.
4 Ibid.
45 See Landers, Frary & Clark v. Universal Cooler Corporation, 85 F.
(2d) 46 (C. C. A. 2d 1936); H. Milgrim & Bros. v. Schlesinger, 168 Ore.
476, 123 P. (2d) 196 (1942).
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being always troublesome and generally impossible to follow the busi-
ness practices of a newcomer closely enough to be sure that they are
not damaging.46
Where a court has weighed the conflicting interests of the liti-
gants, it has been said that the interest in reputation is more sub-
stantial than the right to expand one's business to other goods. 47
B. Right of Expansion: Where the goods, services, or busi-
nesses of the litigants are not in actual competition, the right to in-
junctive relief has been rested by some courts upon the necessity of
preventing an infringer from forestalling the normal and natural ex-
pansion 48 or reasonable extension 49 of the complaining party's busi-
ness or trade, at least with respect to markets which already identify
his goods or business with his mark or name 10 or with respect to
related goods.51 The right to expand business to goods of a different
class is impliedly recognized in some of the cases where the necessary
competition has been defined as real, "present or prospective," and
where relief has been denied because there was no evidence that the
defendant ever intended "presently or prospectively" to compete in
a different class of goods.5 2
The right to expand has been held to be less palpable than the
right to protect one's reputation,53 and it has also been said that the
right to expand may perhaps to some degree be measured by what
the newcomer's practice has been and is likely to be.54  It has been
intimated that the courts are reluctant to apply "the doctrine of
natural expansion," since unless they be exceedingly careful, it would
46 S. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 116 F. (2d) 427 (C. C. A. 2d 1940)
(the court, however, remarking that it should not be forgotten that so long
as the newcomer has not in fact misconducted himself the injury is prospective
and contingent).
47 Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132 F. (2d) 822 (C. C. A.
2d 1943).
48 Emerson Electric Mfg. Co. v. Emerson Radio & P. Corp., 105 F. (2d)
908 (C. C. A. 2d 1939) ; S. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 116 F. (2d) 427
(C. C. A. 2d 1940).
49 Henry Muhs Co. v. Farm Craft Foods, 37 F. Supp. 1013 (E. D. N. Y.
1941) (butter and meat products as compared with cheese).
50 Landers, Frary & Clark v. Universal Cooler Corporation, 35 F. (2d) 46
(C. C. A. 2d 1936); National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47
F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942).
51 Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 2d 1910)
(where it was held that a manufacturer of toilet brushes has the right to
start the manufacture of tooth brushes under the tradename used for the toilet
brushes).
52 Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 7 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A.
3d 1925).
53 Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132 F. (2d) 822 (C. C. A.
2d 1943) (recognizing, upon principle, that the right of the senior user of a
mark to pre-empt the market for later exploitation may be taken into con-
sideration, but holding it "a very slender thread indeed").
54 Ibid.
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lead into "monopoly." 55 In some cases, the right of expansion has
been denied with respect to goods not of the same class and
description."
C. Unjust Enrichment: Where the goods, services, or busi-
nesses of the litigants are not in actual competition, the right to in-
junctive relief has been rested by some courts on the ground that
the infringer is unfairly enjoying an increase in his own business,
paid for directly by the complaining party, yet without any return
from the former to the latter on its investment,57 the infringer thus
"obtaining an unearned profit." 58
Without expressly resting their decision on the ground of "un-
just enrichment," the courts, in granting relief, occasionally have
suggested that the infringer cannot be allowed to reap (the benefit
of the complaining party's good will) where he has not sown 59 or
to gain the advantage of the wide publicity which the complaining
party has earned by the expenditure of a large sum of money in
advertising.60
It is submitted that unjust enrichment is not a satisfactory
theory upon which to rest relief in situations in which actual com-
petition is lacking. It has correctly been pointed out,61 that if the
adoption of the complaining party's trademark or tradename by the
defendant ". . . were merely to increase his business, yielding him
higher profits, with no consequent injury to the plaintiff, no reason
appears why the latter should have a remedy."
D. "Whittling Away" or "Dilution": Where the goods, ser-
vices, or businesses of the litigants are not in actual competition, the
right to injunctive relief has been rested by some courts upon the
necessity of preventing "the gradual whittling away" 62 or "dilution"
55 See Kay Dunhill, Inc. v. Dunhill Fabrics, 44 F. Supp. 922 (S. D. N. Y.
1942).
56 Holland Furnace Co. v. New Holland Mach. Co., 24 F. (2d) 751 (E. D.
Pa. 1927); Parsons Trading Co. v. Hoffman, 107 Misc. 536, 177 N. Y. Supp.
713 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd, 200 App. Div. 900, 192 N. Y. Supp. 942 (1st Dep't
1922).5 Dodge Bros. v. East, 8 F. (2d) 872 (E. D. N. Y. 1925).
58 Bond Stores v. Bond Stores, 104 F. (2d) 124 (C. C. A. 3d 1939).
59 Kotabs v. Kotex Co., 50 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 3d 1931); Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Co. v. Aetna Auto Finance, 123 F. (2d) 582 (C. C. A. 4th
1941).
60 Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliott, 7 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 3d 1925);
Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp. 459(Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1st Dep't
1932), aff'd men., 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30 (1933).61 See 37 COL. L. REv. 593, footnote 53 (1937).
62Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp.
459 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1st
Dep't 1932), affd mene., 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30 (1933); Rainbow Shops
v. Rainbow Specialty Shops, 176 Misc. 339, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 390 (Sup. Ct.
1941); Lady Esther v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, 317 Ill. App. 451, 46
N. E. (2d) 165 (1943).
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of the complaining party's trademark or tradename, 3 or the "dis-
persion" of its identity and hold upon the public mind.6 4 Under this
theory, the owner of a trademark or tradename is regarded as pos-
sessed of an interest in not having another destroy the distinctiveness
of his mark by borrowing it.65 "A mark is more than a symbol of
existing good will or a mere commercial signature; it has a creative
function; it serves as a 'silent salesman' to attract customers. The
dilution of its selling powers and "the whittling away of its unique-
ness" by use of noncompeting products, constitutes a real injury for
which there should be redress." 66
It will be observed that this theory does not rest upon, and is
applicable irrespective of, confusion or likelihood of confusion as to
source or origin of goods or services, but no cases have been found
in which there was not present an element of confusion.67
Though the courts claim that the theories discussed above are
not inconsistent with the general rule requiring competition but are
merely exceptions and limitations, the fundamental policy followed
in some of the more recent cases seems contrary to that underlying
the earlier cases which support the general rule.
Effect of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act
In July, 1947 the new Lanham Trade-Mark Act 68 becomes
effective and with its taking effect, we can look for far reaching
changes to take place in American trademark law. This new legis-
lation touches upon most phases of ownership, registration and use
of trademarks in the United States as well as abroad but the only
parts we will take up will be those that affect this discussion.
Until this Act came into being, federal registration of a trade-
mark did not put all local users and newcomers on notice that the
63 Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N. Y.
Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (referring to Schecter, Rational Basis of Trade-
mark Protection 40 HEAIv. L. REv. 813 [1927]; Schecter, Fog and Fiction in
Tradenark Protection 36 COL. L. REv. 60 [1936]).
64 Rainbow Shops v. Rainbow Specialty Shops, 176 Misc. 339, 27 N. Y. S.
(2d) 390 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
65National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499
(D. Mass. 1942).66 Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N. Y.
Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1937). See Stork Restaurant v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90
(E. D. Pa. 1941), where the court emphasized that "upon the strength of a
single, if sustained, precedent the plaintiff could be literally 'hemmed in' by
'Stork Clubs' until the public was so surfeited with the same that the mere
mention of the name would provoke contrary reactions."
67 See Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N. Y.
Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1937), where it was pointed out that even in the famous
Tiffany case there was evidence of public confusion, but that the court, in part
at least, rested its decision on the broader ground.
6860 STAT. 540 (1946), 15 U. S. C. § 1051 (1946 Supp.).
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registered mark was no longer available for use in interstate com-
merce. This large gap in trademark protection is closed by the new
bill.
Section 22 09 specifies that registering on the Principal Register
"shall be constructive notice of the registrant's claim of owner-
ship ... ." This is a vitally important change. It means that after
July, 1947, a company that fails to register a trademark can expect no
protection, whatsoever, outside the state in which he may have been
the first user of the mark. However, once a federal registration is
issued, there can be only one lawful user in interstate and foreign
commerce. It is worthy of notice that this protection of "construc-
tive notice" is also extended to include marks registered under the
acts of 1881 and 1905.
Section 22 taken by itself would seem to render pointless and
fruitless a discussion as to the need for actual competition before
territorial protection will be expanded, if it weren't for the fact that
the rule of there being only one lawful user in interstate and foreign
commerce after a federal registration of the mark doesn't apply where
we have cases involving concurrent registration.
Section 2 70 of the new Act authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to register the same or similar mark "as concurrent regis-
trations" to more than one registrant "where they have become en-
titled to use such marks as a result of their concurrent lawful use
thereof, prior to any of the filing dates of the applications in-
volved. . . ." Where such circumstances appear, the Commissioner
may grant both registrations if he comes to the conclusion that con-
fusion is not likely to result from the continued use of such marks.
He may, in granting concurrent registrations, prescribe "conditions
and limitations as to the mode, place of use or the goods. . . ." To
predict the conditions and limitations the Commissioner may ulti-
mately develop for concurrent registrations is, of course, impossible
but the following conclusion would seem to follow from the language
and legislative history of this provision: A search of the earlier
drafts of this section reveals the words "honest concurrent use" to
have been contemplated but the section, as finally adopted, refers
instead to a "concurrent lawful use." We must assume that such
"lawful" use exists in all cases in which the courts would recognize
a separate ownership of the same mark as used in different parts of
the country on the same or similar merchandise. Thus, any use the
courts would consider an infringement could never constitute a
"lawful" concurrent use. There can, of course, be no "concurrent
lawful use" after a federal registration because such registration is
"constructive notice" but where an application for concurrent regis-
6960 STAT. 540 (1946), 15 U. S. C. 4 1052 (1946 Supp.).
7060 STAT. 540 (1946), 15 U. S. C. § 1072 (1946 Supp.).
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tration is made, such concurrent use having occurred prior to federal
registration by the first user, then the problem of determining what
constitutes an infringement is still with us and the rules laid down
by the courts in cases of infringement must be applied.
There is no provision under the new Act for the registration
of tradenames and so we have no change in the extent of protection
given the tradenames, whereas, it now appears that trademarks have
national protection.
Conclusion
The general rule is that the scope of protection of a trademark
or tradename is coextensive only with the territory throughout which
it is known and from which it has drawn its trade, and the adoption
and use of a tradename or trademark does not project the right of
protection in advance of the extension of the trade, nor operate as a
claim of territorial rights over areas into which it may thereafter be
deemed desirable to extend the trade.
Many of the more modern cases, however, have held that actual
competition isn't a necessary prerequisite for the expansion of trade-
mark and tradename protection. Among the theories that these later
cases rest upon are those of unjust enrichment, "whittling away" of
the trademark or tradename, reputation and good will, and right of
expansion. And although many of the principles underlying these
latter day decisions are contrary to the principles underlying the gen-
eral rule, the courts have stoutly maintained that these theories are
merely exceptions and limitations on the general rule.
The Lanham Act extends national protection to a trademark
once it has been registered because registration is constructive notice.
However, the new Act provides for concurrent registration where
there was a "lawful concurrent use" by the second user before the
first user registered his mark and the Commissioner will have to
look to decisional law in order to determine where a "lawful con-
current use" existed.
In closing, it should be noted that as tradenames cannot be reg-
istered under the Lanham Act they will not be subject to the expanded
protection extended to trademarks.
DANIEL A. LIPSIG.
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